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437 
Hudec’s Methods—and Ours 
Jeffrey L. Dunoff* 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 The republication of Robert Hudec’s Developing Countries 
and the GATT Legal System1 (Developing Countries) provides 
an apt occasion to reflect on the book’s arguments and enduring 
influence. Developing Countries skillfully details the history of 
GATT’s relationship with developing states between GATT’s 
founding, in 1947, and the mid-1980s. Other symposium 
contributions review trade policy developments in the 
intervening years.2 In contrast, this essay will explore one of 
the most widely noted, and controversial, claims that Hudec 
offers in Developing Countries, namely the argument that 
developing states’ successful advocacy for nonreciprocal and 
preferential treatment had disserved their economic interests.3 
 
* Professor of Law and Director, Institute for International Law & Public 
Policy, Temple University Beasley School of Law. This essay was prepared in 
connection with a November 2010 ASIL International Law Interest Group 
meeting entitled “International Economic Law in a Time of Change: 
Reassessing Legal Theory, Doctrine, Methodology and Policy Prescriptions” 
held at the University of Minnesota Law School. I am grateful to Joel 
Trachtman and Frank Garcia for thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of 
this essay, which draws on arguments developed in Jeffrey L. Dunoff, 
Dysfunction, Diversion and the Debate over Preferences: (How) Do Preferential 
Trade Policies Work?, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 
45 (Chantal Thomas & Joel P. Trachtman eds., Oxford University Press 2009). 
I am also grateful to the conference organizers, Professors Greg Shaffer and 
Susan Franck, and to the editors of the Minnesota Journal of International 
Law for inviting me to participate in this Symposium. © 2011 
 1. ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL 
SYSTEM (Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 2011) (1987) [hereinafter Developing 
Countries]. 
 2. See generally Bernard M. Hoekman, Proposals for WTO Reform: A 
Synthesis and Assessment, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2011); Chiedu 
Osakwe, Developing Countries and GATT Rules: Dynamic Transformation in 
Trade Policy Behavior and Performance, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 
2011) (discussing the shift from GATT’s “special and differential” treatment to 
policy reforms and liberalization in developing countries). 
 3. Indeed, Michael Finger’s introduction to the new edition suggests that 
Developing Countries is cited most frequently for this proposition. HUDEC, 
supra note 1, at 16–17. 
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More than two decades after Developing Countries was first 
issued, how should we assess Hudec’s claims—and how should 
we think about preferences? Given Hudec’s long and 
distinguished tenure at the University of Minnesota Law 
School—and his central role in the founding of this journal—it 
is entirely appropriate that critical examination of Bob Hudec’s 
controversial claims occur in the pages of the Minnesota 
Journal of International Law. 
There is much to admire in Developing Countries; 
elegantly written and closely argued, the book deftly combines 
incisive political history and careful legal analysis. However, 
the book’s claims are necessarily shaped by the methodological 
approaches Hudec adopts, the theory of trade politics he 
employs, and the ontology of international system that he 
draws upon. Part I of the book, consisting of Hudec’s 
authoritative retelling of GATT debates over preferences, reads 
as a straightforward realist account of international trade 
relations. In this retelling, states are the key actors and they 
both view and use trade negotiations as vehicles to advance 
their political and economic interests. Part II of the book, 
containing Hudec’s influential analysis of the effects of 
preferences, has a strikingly different theoretical and 
methodological orientation. Here, analysis turns from inter-
state relations to a public choice account of interactions among 
interest groups and bureaucracies. In the writings of a less 
talented author the apparent tension between the differing 
methodological approaches could be easily dismissed; in 
Hudec’s case they provide an important clue to understanding 
the assumptions that drive much of Hudec’s analysis. In short, 
virtually all of Developing Countries’ conclusions are premised 
upon a highly stylized and deeply pessimistic view of the 
processes and outcomes of both domestic politics and 
international institutions.4  
However, Hudec’s methods are not the only possible ones 
that can be used to understand the effects of preferences, and 
since Developing Countries was first issued much empirical 
work has focused on the implications of preference programs. I 
 
 4. In focusing upon Hudec’s methodological commitments, this paper 
stands in stark contrast with much of the writing on Hudec’s scholarship, 
which emphasizes Hudec’s pragmatism and elides the ideological and 
methodological commitments that inform this pragmatism. In this respect, 
Ricardo Ramirez contribution to this symposium is representative of most 
approaches to Hudec’s scholarly work. See Ricardo Ramirez, Professor Hudec 
and the Appellate Body, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2011). 
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summarize below recent empirical (largely econometric) 
literature addressing the effects of preferences. As we shall see, 
some of this more recent research suggests some important 
qualifications to Hudec’s rather bleak view of preferences—and, 
perhaps, his equally bleak view of the performance of domestic 
and international political actors. More importantly, 
juxtaposing Hudec’s methodologies with more recent 
alternative methodological approaches suggests several 
potentially fruitful lines of future research.  
The final section of this paper explores yet another 
dimension of Hudec’s methodological commitments and 
rhetorical style. Although many properly praise Hudec’s lean 
and jargon-free prose, this paper will show Developing 
Countries is significantly more theoretically sophisticated than 
it purports to be, and offer a few reasons why the book, in 
effect, misrepresents itself. This paper also describes some of 
the costs of selling Developing Countries short. By implication, 
this analysis suggests a number of methodological issues that 
contemporary trade scholarship should address in light of the 
ways that the discipline of trade law has evolved since 
Developing Countries was first issued. 
II. THE DEBATE OVER PREFERENCES AT THE GATT  
Developing Countries opens with the history of a debate 
that has bedeviled the trade system since its inception—and 
continues to be controversial today.5 Given that trading nations 
enjoy widely varying levels of economic and social development, 
should the trade system provide differential and more favorable 
treatment to developing states? In particular, should goods 
from developing states enjoy preferential access to the markets 
of developed states? Or does preferential treatment introduce 
distortions into international markets—and thus, are uniform, 
nondiscriminatory rules more appropriate? Hudec’s 
authoritative account of the twists and turns in debates over 
preferences thoughtfully reviews the key issues in this long-
standing controversy. 
Hudec notes that when considering whether to extend 
preferential treatment to developing state goods, the framers of 
 
 5. See, e.g., SALLIE JAMES, THE U.S. GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF 
PREFERENCES: HELPING THE POOR BUT AT WHAT PRICE? 1 (CATO Institute 
2010), available at http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=12555 
(proffering that the Unites States’ Generalized Policy of Preferences distorts 
markets and limits the economic development of developing countries).  
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the GATT system had little relevant experience to draw on.6 
Although the destructive trade wars and mercantile policies of 
the 1930s provided GATT’s drafters with concrete knowledge 
regarding tariffs, quotas, and similar issues, the negotiators 
had little relevant experience regarding the role of developing 
states in a multilateral trade system.7 
The basic positions of the key actors in the negotiations 
were relatively straightforward—but nearly impossible to 
reconcile.8 The United States, the dominant economic and 
political actor and a prime mover in the negotiations, sought a 
non-discriminatory system that had no special rules for 
developing states.9 Contrariwise, the Europeans sought to 
maintain a version of preference systems historically associated 
with their colonial possessions.10 Both positions reflected 
national interests. As the world’s strongest economy, the 
United States believed that it had the most to gain from open 
world markets.11 The Europeans believed that market 
interventions were necessary to assist developing states.12 
Moreover, European resistance to a strong nondiscrimination 
norm was rooted in their collective interest in extending 
preferential treatment to each other to boost post-war 
European reconstruction.13 Developing states sought special 
treatment in the trade realm, including resource transfers, 
freedom from trade disciplines, tariff preferences, and non-
reciprocity.14 Hudec suggests that developing states’ positions 
 
 6. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 26–27. 
 7. See id. (“Not only was there no Golden Age to point towards as a goal 
but, perhaps more important, there had been no past failures that could serve 
as a lesson about what not to do.”). 
 8. Leading accounts of the negotiations include: WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN, 
JR., THE UNITED STATES AND THE RESTORATION OF WORLD TRADE (1950); 
RICHARD N. GARDNER, STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY (1956); DOUGLAS A. 
IRWIN, PETROS C. MAVROIDIS & ALAN O. SYKES, THE GENESIS OF THE GATT 
(reprt. 2009); JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969); 
CLAIR WILCOX, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE (1949); THOMAS W. ZEILER, 
FREE TRADE, FREE WORLD: THE ADVENT OF THE GATT (1999). 
 9. The U.S. push for an end to discriminatory trade rules should not be 
understood to mean that the United States was unaware of the special issues 
posed by developing states. Rather, the U.S. argued that the needs of 
developing states should be addressed in other fora, such as the United 
Nations and World Bank. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 28–29. 
 10. Id. at 28. 
 11. Id. at 29. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 30. 
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grew out of their colonial experience, in which they saw colonial 
powers attempt to maximize economic gains by controlling 
trade and suppressing economic competition.15 In addition, 
developing states were acutely aware of developed nations’ 
protectionist tendencies, such as the U.S. enactment of Smoot-
Hawley tariffs.16  
Initiating a pattern that would recur throughout GATT’s 
history, no single party’s view ultimately prevailed in the 
negotiations, and the discussions “ended, as they had begun, 
with no basic consensus on the trade-policy rules that should 
apply to developing countries.”17 As a result, the original GATT 
contained many terms that reflected parts of various parties’ 
positions. Thus the text contained several provisions developing 
states favored, including clauses permitting trade restrictions 
to protect infant industries and for balance-of-payments 
purposes.18 However, the original GATT did not adopt the 
principle of preferential access to developed states’ markets 
that developing states sought.  
Hudec perceptively notes that state practice during GATT’s 
early years introduced—and eventually embedded—
“fundamental . . . contradiction” into the trade regime.19 For 
instance, the United States purported to insist on “reciprocity,” 
that is, that any actions it took to liberalize access to U.S. 
markets should be paid for—or reciprocated—by reductions in 
trade barriers by other states. Hudec argues that the United 
States’ “fixation with reciprocity” reflected the country’s 
mercantilist view of international trade.20 The implicit theory 
underlying this view is that policies that increase exports are 
desirable while those that increase imports are undesirable; 
hence states offer to make “concessions” in lowering their own 
trade barriers to obtain similar “concessions” from trading 
partners.21 Of course, if reducing one’s own trade barriers is 
understood to be a costly “concession,” then it follows that 
maintaining (or raising) barriers will be understood as a 
benefit. Hudec argues that the United States’ mercantile 
 
 15. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 30. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 31. 
 18. Id. at 31–32. 
 19. See id. at 34 (identifying the contradictory nature of developed states 
demanding trade liberalization policies and “payment”).  
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
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approach to trade policy implicitly legitimated developing state 
demands for differential treatment.22 Accordingly, the United 
States in effect shifted the basis for all future debate from 
“whether” preferential treatment was appropriate to “how 
much” assistance to give: “Once it had been conceded, as a 
matter of principle, that legal freedom [from GATT disciplines] 
constitutes ‘help’ to developing states, the future was virtually 
fixed.”23  
Developing Countries proceeds to detail that future. Hudec 
notes that, during GATT’s first decade, trading nations learned 
that once a negotiation begins, all parties have to be prepared 
to “give” something, and that “the easiest concession [for 
developed states] to ‘give’ is a little more legal freedom.”24 
Hudec demonstrates that, by 1955, GATT documents reflected 
a “fuller and now almost enthusiastic endorsement of the idea 
that legal freedom ‘helps’ developing countries.”25 
Consequently, “[t]he declining rigor of GATT legal discipline 
towards developing countries produced a rather curious legal 
policy. The substance withered, but the form remained.”26 
In 1959, an influential GATT report directed attention to 
the link between disappointing developing state export 
earnings and developed state trade barriers.27 As a result, 
developing countries began to focus less on securing exceptions 
for their own policies and more on obtaining preferential access 
to developed state markets. Hudec’s account of the contentious 
and extended debates over the extension of preferences to 
developing states over the next several decades is, in many 
respects, a story of form without substance. Time and again, 
richer nations agreed to texts that seemed to promise 
preferential treatment to developing states, but these 
instruments often said less than they appeared to, and 
frequently delivered less than they promised.  
By the 1960s, developing states were organizing to advance 
a collective voice in trade policy, and successfully pushed for 
the establishment of the United Nations Conference on Trade 
 
 22. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 35. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 43. 
 25. Id. at 42–43. 
 26. Id. at 44. 
 27. See id. at 43–44 (noting how developing countries were using more 
balance-of-payments restrictions in spite of substantial economic growth (in 
absolute terms)). 
DUNOFF - Final Version 4/22/2011 6:16 PM 
2011] HUDEC’S METHODS—AND OURS 443 
 
and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964 as a counterweight or 
alternative to GATT.28 Developments at UNCTAD changed the 
political dynamics within GATT, and in late 1964 GATT parties 
finalized drafting new treaty language.29 A new Part IV of 
GATT, entitled “Trade and Development,” came into effect in 
1966.30 The new language acknowledged that market access for 
exports from developing states has to be improved; however it 
did not prescribe the methods for doing so.31 Significantly, all of 
the new language in Part IV was carefully worded not to 
impose new legal obligations on the developed contracting 
parties.32 Nevertheless, Part IV can be seen as a formal 
institutional acknowledgment that action was necessary to 
increase developing state access to developed state markets. 
Preferences were debated at a 1968 UNCTAD meeting in 
India, and in 1970 UNCTAD adopted “Agreed Conclusions” 
regarding the establishment of a “Generalized System of 
Preferences.”33 Since preferential tariff treatment for 
developing state goods would violate GATT’s most favored 
nation provision, in 1971 GATT members agreed to a ten-year 
waiver permitting—but not requiring—states to grant 
preferential tariff treatment to developing state goods.34 In 
1979, GATT parties removed the waiver’s time limits through 
adoption of a decision commonly known as the “Enabling 
Clause,”35 which authorizes certain forms of preferential 
 
 28. G.A. Res. 1785, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc 
A/5217, at 14 (Dec. 8, 1962). 
 29. See HUDEC, supra note 1, at 64 (noting GATT’s reinvigorated 
commitment to the interests of developing states). 
 30. Id. at 66. 
 31. See id. at 64 (describing how Part IV—from a technical point of view—
“added nothing to the existing legal relationship between developed and 
developing countries.”). 
 32. See, e.g., id. (indicating how new article XXXVII, entitled 
“Commitments,” requires developed states to take certain actions “to the 
fullest extent possible – that is, except when compelling reasons, which may 
include legal reasons, make it impossible” to do so). 
 33. See id. at 69 (clarifying that “developed countries would grant tariff 
preferences to all (or almost all) developing countries, without reciprocity, on 
all (or almost all) products.”). 
 34. Id. at 70. 
 35. The formal name for the “Enabling Clause” is the “Decision on 
Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation of Developing Countries.” Adopted in November 1979, it includes 
a number of provisions permitting GATT contracting parties to grant 
differential and more favorable treatment to developing states, 
notwithstanding the non-discrimination requirement found in GATT Article I. 
It thus authorizes, most notably, trade concessions granted to developing 
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treatment. Hudec notes that although this text used language 
that appeared to be “legalistic” and thus produced the “illusion 
of greater commitment,” it actually “contained no definable 
legal obligations.”36 Therefore, this much-debated text “added 
nothing to the existing legal relationship between developed 
and developing countries.”37  
The story of the Enabling Clause encapsulates, in many 
respects, the politics of the debate over preferences at the 
GATT. Over time, developing states repeatedly demanded new 
and different forms of preferential treatment, and developed 
states would, for a time, resist these pleas. Predictably, a 
compromise would result that recognized in principle the 
legitimacy of preferential treatment, but that imposed little by 
way of legal obligation and often produced little economic effect. 
Hudec summarizes the “pattern” that emerged: 
. . . [A]s experience with this tactic [of demanding preferential 
treatment] grew, it could be seen that results would continue to be 
very slow in coming. . . . The absence of any real progress led to a 
continual search for additional forms of activity that would give the 
appearance of movement. The GATT became very skillful in creating 
such appearances, primarily by erecting new procedural mountains 
and them climbing them. The GATT’s work evolved into a slow and 
patient form of bureaucratic slogging – unending meetings, detailed 
studies of trade flows and trade barriers and repeated declarations in 
increasingly urgent but never-quite-binding language.38 
History does not proceed along a straight path, and 
developments subsequent to publication of the first edition of 
Developing Countries represent an important turn in the 
trajectory that Hudec outlines. The Uruguay Round, in 
particular, marked a significant shift with respect to the role 
and treatment of developing states in the trade system. First, 
developing states began to play a significant role in the 
negotiating process.39 At the same time, many developing 
 
states under various Generalized System of Preference (GSP) programs. 
HUDEC, supra note 1, at 64, 85. 
 36. Id. at 64. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 55. 
 39. See generally AMRITA NARLIKAR, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: BARGAINING COALITIONS IN THE GATT & WTO 
(2003) (providing a detailed study of the bargaining coalitions strategically 
formed by developing states in the GATT and WTO). It should be noted that 
although the Uruguay Round marked an increase in participation, following 
the conclusion of the Round many developing states raised significant 
concerns about the nature and quality of their participation. For an analysis, 
see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The WTO in Transition: Of Constituents, Competence 
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states were engaged in a process of significant economic reform. 
For instance, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the emergence of 
the Washington Consensus—not to mention decades of 
disappointing economic results—prompted many developing 
states to embrace trade liberalization and privatization as 
mechanisms to spark economic growth.40 Thus, in the Uruguay 
Round agreements, developing states accepted obligations to 
reduce their own trade barriers, including bindings on a 
substantial number of tariff lines. 
More importantly, the Round’s “single undertaking” 
produced a largely uniform system of rights and obligations.41 
Hence, WTO texts reduced the scope of special exceptions from 
GATT disciplines available to developing states. Moreover, just 
as the number and scope of legal obligations increased, the new 
Dispute Settlement Understanding rendered these obligations 
judicially enforceable.42 Many argue that, taken together, these 
changes reduced the policy flexibility of developing states.  
Yet, the concept of “special and differential” treatment for 
developing states did not disappear entirely in the Uruguay 
Round. While developing states assumed the same obligations 
as developed states, in many cases they were granted 
additional time to implement these obligations.43 Therefore, the 
new agreements represented an important shift from a 
nonreciprocal approach to obligations to a nonreciprocal 
approach to implementation. However, in the post-Uruguay 
Round period, developing states experienced capacity 
constraints and other obstacles that rendered implementation 
difficult or disproportionately costly.44 Developing states 
 
and Coherence, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 979, 980–81 (2001). 
 40. See John Williamson, Williamson Versus the Washington Consensus?, 
THE GROWTH BLOG (Oct. 12, 2008), http://www.growthcommissionblog.org/con
tent/williamson-versus-the-washington-consensus (identifying the need for 
macroeconomic stability, integration into the world economy, and the actual 
use of the market as the principal values that motivated the creation of the 
Washington consensus). 
 41. See Dunoff, supra note 39, at 1007 (clarifying that all parties at the 
Round must participate in all negotiated agreements as a “single 
undertaking.”). 
 42. Id. at 1010. 
 43. See generally J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler, Implementation of 
Uruguay Round Commitments: The Development Challenge, 23 WORLD ECON. 
511 (2000) (discussing some of the problems developing states faced when they 
attempted to implement the Round’s obligations). 
 44. See id. at 511 (categorizing the obligations as investment decisions 
rather than policy commitments). 
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consequently demanded greater amounts of time to meet 
certain obligations, and for more useful information about 
relevant requirements.  
In 2001 a new round of trade negotiations was launched in 
Doha, Qatar. The Doha Ministerial Declaration reaffirmed the 
importance of special and differential treatment of developing 
states.45 It called for a review of provisions affording such 
treatment, with the goal of “making them more precise, 
effective and operational.”46 However, the on-again, off-again 
talks seem to have run aground; in particular, the negotiators’ 
efforts to improve provisions regarding treatment of developing 
states have, to date, borne little fruit.47 
Significantly, in recent years much attention has shifted 
away from the debate over discriminatory trade policies, 
largely because of a perception that these policies have enjoyed 
only moderate success (as discussed in more detail below). An 
emerging consensus argues that access to developed state 
markets is necessary but not sufficient, as supply-side capacity 
and trade-related infrastructure constraints inhibit the ability 
of developing states to realize the potential benefits of 
preference programs. Hence, attention has shifted to 
identifying ways to provide more direct assistance to improve 
the competitiveness of developing state firms. Such 
considerations have produced an “Aid for Trade” agenda that 
has attracted substantial diplomatic and academic energies.48 
 
 45. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 
November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 ¶ 13 (emphasizing that “special and 
differential treatment for developing countries shall be an integral part of all 
elements of the negotiations . . . .”). 
 46. Id. ¶ 44. 
 47. As this is written (in fall 2010), the fate of these negotiations is 
uncertain, although it is difficult to be optimistic. For analysis of some of the 
difficulties impeding progress, see Raj Bhala, Resurrecting the Doha Round: 
Devilish Details, Grand Themes, and China Too, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1 (2009); 
Sungjoon Cho, The Demise of Development in the Doha Round Negotiations, 45 
TEX. INT’L L.J. 573 (2009). 
 48. For a sampling of developed state plans, see, for example, Conclusions 
of the Council and of the Representatives of the Gov’t of the Member States 
Meeting Within the Council on EU Strategy on Aid for Trade: Enhancing EU 
Support for Trade-Related Needs in Developing Countries, 14470/07 (Oct 29, 
2007), available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st14/st14470.e
n07.pdf; Dep’t for Int’l Development [DFID], Sharing the Benefits of Trade, 
Strategy 2008–12 (2008); SDC, UNITED SWISS DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION 
STRATEGY—MESSAGE ON COUNTRIES OF THE SOUTH 2009–12 (2008), 
available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.dfid.gov.u
k/Media-Room/News-Stories/2008/UK-launches-Aid-for-Trade-Strategy/. 
Furthermore, international bodies have produced a number of reports. See, 
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This paper shall discuss the shift toward “Aid for Trade” and its 
relationship to some of the ideas in Developing Countries, in 
part III below. 
Developing Countries’ account of the history of debates 
over preferences is nothing if not sobering. As Hudec tells the 
story, trading nations devoted substantial diplomatic attention 
over many years to the treatment of developing states. 
However, what these long-standing efforts generated was an 
inconclusive political debate that in turn produced ambiguous 
legal texts. The crucial question, of course, is whether 
preference programs are effective. This paper shall 
demonstrate there are various ways to approach this question.  
III. DO PREFERENCE PROGRAMS WORK? 
The second part of Developing Countries transitions from 
historical narrative to evaluation: What is the impact of special 
and differential trade policies? Does the granting of 
preferential access to developed state markets boost developing 
state economies? Or, as Hudec frames the inquiry, “[i]s the 
current GATT legal policy [of providing preferences] in the best 
interest of the developing countries themselves, or would 
developing countries achieve better results under a legal policy 
based on . . . reciprocity and non-discrimination?”49  
These sound like empirical questions, and a substantial 
amount of econometric literature purports to provide empirical 
answers to these questions. However, Developing Countries 
does not draw appreciably upon econometric literature.50 To be 
 
e.g., NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, AID FOR TRADE AND HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT, available at http://europeandcis.undp.org/home/show/96DEA4
F0-F203-1EE9-B4C334E151D151DF; WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION & 
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, AID FOR 
TRADE AT A GLANCE 2009: MAINTAINING MOMENTUM (2009). The World 
Economic Forum produces an annual assessment of obstacles to trade, with a 
focus on market access, border administration, transport and 
telecommunications infrastructure, and general business environment. See 
WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, THE GLOBAL ENABLING TRADE REPORT 2010 
(2010), available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalEnablingTrade
_Report_2010.pdf. A sampling of the academic commentary can be found in 
AID FOR TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (Dominique Njinkeu & Hugo Cameron 
eds., 2007). 
 49. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 115. 
 50. Indeed, the text explicitly disclaims any intent to engage any 
empirical literature, stating that “[i]t is not the purpose of this study to 
examine it [empirical literature] in any depth.” Id. at 116. Thus, although the 
text references the empirical literature from time to time, it does not analyze 
this literature in any sustained fashion. 
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sure, much of the literature has been published after 
Developing Countries was first released. Still, the decision not 
to survey the available empirical literature is puzzling given 
that all relevant actors in the preferences debate agree on the 
goal of providing greater economic benefits to developing states; 
the central point of contention is whether preferences in fact 
advance this objective.51  
Rather than undertake an empirical evaluation, Hudec 
makes an unexpected analytical move; part II of Developing 
Countries evaluates the effects of preferences through a 
political economy lens. In particular, Hudec examines whether 
developed states’ preference programs make it more or less 
difficult for developing states to pursue liberal economic 
policies. Since both the econometric and the political economy 
approaches can enrich our understanding of the effects of 
preferences, this paper briefly reviews the empirical literature 
on preferences that Developing Countries does not address, and 
then summarizes Hudec’s political economy arguments. This 
paper will demonstrate that each line of analysis provides 
ample reason to doubt the utility of preferential treatment. 
A. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF PREFERENCES 
Today, all developed states—and a number of developing 
states—have adopted GSP programs that grant preferential 
tariff treatment to goods from developing and least developed 
states.52 In addition, several states, including prominently the 
United States and the EU, have enacted preferential tariff 
programs targeted at specific groups of developing states.53  
The commonplace implementation of GSP programs has 
 
 51. See id. at 132–34 (focusing on “the extent to which the theoretical 
welfare gains [from preference policies] are likely to be achieved in practice, 
the actual cost of achieving those gains and whether the gains are likely to 
outweigh the costs.”). 
 52. Under the United States’ GSP program, for example, 131 beneficiary 
developing states, including 43 least-developed states, are eligible to export 
approximately 4,800 types of products duty free into the United States. See 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/trade-development/prefere
nce-programs/generalized-system-preference-gsp (last visited Feb. 22, 2011); 
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, U.S. GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF 
PREFERENCES GUIDEBOOK (2010), available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_sen
d/1597. 
 53. See, e.g., Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act 19 U.S.C. § 2701 
(1983); Andean Trade Preference Act 19 U.S.C. § 3201 (1991); African Growth 
and Opportunity Act 19 U.S.C. § 3701 (2000). 
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inspired a substantial amount of literature examining the 
empirical effects of preference programs. Although no 
consensus exists in this large body of scholarship, it is fair to 
say that much of this literature is deeply skeptical about the 
economic and development effects of preferences. Specifically, 
the weight of the econometric and simulation analysis 
undertaken to date suggests that preference programs are 
underinclusive and underutilized, that the benefits generated 
by preference programs are limited and narrowly focused, and 
that preferences have contributed disappointingly little to 
economic development in beneficiary states.54 Since the various 
limitations of preference programs have been ably and 
thoroughly discussed elsewhere, a brief summation of the 
arguments is presented below. 
One factor that significantly reduces the value of 
preferential treatment is the wide-spread exclusion of goods in 
developed state preference programs from sectors in which 
developing states enjoy a comparative advantage.55 
Particularly controversial examples of limitations on 
economically significant goods include the strict limitations on 
imports of sugar from the United States’ Caribbean Basin 
Initiative (CBI),56 the exclusion of tuna, leather and footwear 
products, petroleum products and apparel from the United 
States’ Andean Trade Preferences Act,57 and highly complex 
rules regarding apparel found in the United States’ African 
Growth and Opportunity Act.58 Conversely, developing state 
 
 54. See KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT, OPEN MARKETS FOR THE POOREST 
COUNTRIES: TRADE PREFERENCES THAT WORK (2010); Caglar Ozden & Eric 
Reinhardt, Unilateral Preference Programs: The Evidence, in ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT AND MULTILATERAL TRADE COOPERATION 189 (Simon J. 
Evenett & Bernard M. Hoekman eds., 2006); Caglar Ozden & Eric Reinhardt, 
The Perversity of Preferences: GSP and Developing Country Trade Policies, 
1976–2000, 78 J. DEV. ECON. 1 (2005). 
 55. See, e.g., Global Trade Liberalization and the Developing Countries, 
INT’L MONETARY FUND (Nov. 2001), http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/200
1/110801.htm (describing how developing states often enjoy a comparative 
advantage in labor-intensive industries and agricultural products, yet 
developed states often exclude those products from preference programs). 
 56. 19 U.S.C. § 2703(d). The Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act is an 
extension of CBI; notably the bill extends eligibility for preferential tariff 
treatment to a number of sensitive products, including apparel and petroleum 
products. Id. at § 2703(b)(4). 
 57. 19 U.S.C. § 3201 (b)(1)–(2). As amended by the Andean Trade 
Promotion and Drug Eradication Program, preferences were extended to these 
goods, subject to restrictive rules of origin. Id. at § 3202(d)(11). 
 58. See Raj Bhala, The Limits of American Generosity, 29 FORDHAM INT’L 
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goods often receive preferential trade treatment in markets 
where they do not compete.59 
As states successfully export certain goods, or are dropped 
entirely from preferential programs, they may be left with 
overcapacity and a production structure that does not reflect 
comparative advantage.60 Moreover, the U.S. and EU GSP 
programs also contain safeguard clauses that permit 
preferences to be suspended for certain products or states if 
those imports cause real or potential injury to domestic 
producers.61  
Further, many preference programs condition the grant of 
preferences. For example, the 1984 amendments to the United 
States’ GSP program authorized the United States Trade 
Representative to condition the grant of preferences on, inter 
alia, the beneficiary state’s intellectual property and labor 
rights protections.62 In 1994, the EU added provisions to its 
GSP program authorizing the withdrawal of trade preferences 
contingent on a beneficiary state’s labor policies and,63 in 1998, 
the EU added special preferences conditioned on labor, 
environmental, and anti-drug trafficking policies.64 Developed 
states have repeatedly invoked such conditions to exclude, or 
threaten to exclude, certain developing states from preferential 
 
L.J. 299, 382 (2006) (discussing the inherent irony in the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act as the added complexities of the rules create disincentives to 
obtain the Act’s benefits). 
 59. Celine Carrere & Jaime de Melo, The Doha Round and Market Access 
for LDCs: Scenarios for the EU and US Markets, 44 J. WORLD TRADE 251, 268 
(2010). 
 60. See Alexander Keck & Patrick Low, Special and Differential 
Treatment in the WTO: Why, When and How?, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
AND MULTILATERAL TRADE COOPERATION 147, 157–159 (Simon J. Evenett & 
Bernard M. Hoekman eds., 2006).  
 61. VIVIAN C. JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33663, GENERALIZED 
SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES: BACKGROUND AND RENEWAL DEBATE 8 (2008). 
 62. GSP Renewal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–573, § 503, 98 Stat. 2948, 
3019 (1984). 
 63. 2001 O.J. (C311) 47. 
 64. DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR TRADE, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE 
EUROPEAN UNION’S GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES 6–9 (2004), 
available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/march/tradoc_116448.pd
f. India challenged the EU’s special tariff program in European Communities. 
See generally Appellate Body Report, European Communities–Conditions for 
the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R 
(Apr. 7, 2004) (providing India’s arguments against EU’s trade preferences). 
For an analysis, see Jeffry L. Dunoff, When— and Why— Do Hard Cases Make 
Bad Law? The GSP Dispute, in WTO LAW AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 283 
(George A. Bermann & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2007). 
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tariff treatment. For example, the Central African Republic, 
Eritrea, Cote d’Ivoire and Mauritania were all denied 
preferential treatment under the AGOA statute following 
political events such as coups and failures to implement 
democratic reforms.65  
In addition, most preference programs are legislated to last 
a certain number of years then expire, and must then be 
reauthorized. Legislative reauthorization is, of course, never 
guaranteed, and has at times occurred on a retroactive basis 
following expiration of the program. For example, the United 
States’s GSP program has been renewed a number of times 
since its inception in 1974; at least eight of these legislative 
renewals have been after periods of expiration ranging in 
length from two to fifteen months. Most recently, the GSP 
program expired on December 31, 2010, and as of early 2011 it 
was unclear whether, and when, it will be renewed. Similarly, 
the Andean preference program expired in December 2001; it 
was renewed in late 2002 and several times thereafter. Most 
recently, in 2009, Congress extended the program until 
December 31, 2010.66  
Both individually and in the aggregate, these statutorily-
mandated features of preference programs introduce 
substantial commercial uncertainties, and hence lowered the 
incentives to invest in eligible sectors. Simply put, investors 
and importing firms attracted by preferences have reduced 
incentives to invest in or source from beneficiary states when 
both the legal status and longevity of the preferences is in 
doubt. 
A number of other factors tend to reduce developing states’ 
ability to take advantage of the preferences that are potentially 
available. Perhaps most importantly, complex rules of origin 
and relatively high administrative costs result in significant 
underutilization of available preferences.67 In 1999, for 
 
 65. Compare General Country Eligibility Provisions, AGAO.GOV, 
http://www.agoa.gov/AGOAEligibility /index.asp (last visited Feb. 22, 2011), 
with DANIELLE LANGTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31772U.S. TRADE AND 
INVESTMENT RELATIONSHIP WITH SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: THE AFRICAN 
GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITY ACT AND BEYOND 25 (2008). 
 66. Press Release, USTR, USTR Ron Kirk Welcomes Extension of GSP 
and ATPA Programs (Dec. 28, 2009). 
 67. Rules of origin set the conditions a product must satisfy to be 
considered as originating from a beneficiary state. For a classic piece on origin 
in preference programs and their costs, see JAN HERIN, RULES OF ORIGIN AND 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TARIFF LEVELS IN EFTA AND IN THE EC, European 
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example, just one third of EU imports eligible for preferences 
actually entered the EU with a reduced tariff, largely due to 
complex and restrictive rules of origin;68 during the same year, 
excluding minerals, only four percent of eligible U.S. imports 
from developing countries received preferential treatment.69 A 
more recent study found that the share of eligible exports to the 
EU that requested GSP treatment was only six percent.70 
Similarly, for the United State’s GSP program, the utilization 
rate of many tariff lines is zero, and the average for all lines is 
25%.71 Conversely, liberalization of restrictive rules of origin 
can produce significant results, as changes to AGOA and 
Canada’s GSP program demonstrate.72 
Finally, the gains that result from preferential tariff 
programs tend to be narrowly concentrated.73 Consider, for 
 
Free Trade Association Occasional Paper No. 13 (1986). For more recent 
research, see U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, 3906, THE ECONOMIC 
EFFECTS OF SIGNIFICANT U.S. IMPORT RESTRAINTS: FIFTH UPDATE 2007 
(2007); Patricia Augier, Michael Gasiorek & Charles Lai Tong, The Impact of 
Rules of Origin on Trade Flows, 20 ECON. POL’Y 567 (2005). 
 68. Paul Brenton & Miriam Manchin, Making EU Trade Agreements 
Work: The Role of Rules of Origin, 26 WORLD ECON. 755, 757 (2003). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Miriam Manchin, Preference Utilisation and Tariff Reduction in EU 
Import from ACP Countries, 29 WORLD ECON. 1243, 1247 (2006). Manchin also 
reports that ACP states utilized Cotonou preferences (which are generally 
better than GSP preferences) close to 50% of the time. Id. at 1246. Another 
study found that utilization rates for preferences granted by Canada, the EU, 
Japan, and the U.S. are 61, 31, 46 and 67% respectively. Sub-Committee on 
Least-Developed Countries, Market Access Issues Related to Products of Export 
Interest Originating from Least-Developed Countries, 14, WT/COMTD/LDC/W/
31 TN/MA/S/11 (Sept. 29, 2003). 
 71. Daniel Lederman & Çaglar Özden, U.S. Trade Preferences: All Are Not 
Created Equal 3 (Central Bank of Chile, Working Paper No. 280, 2004).  
 72. For background reading on some of the effects of liberalization, see 
Aaditya Mattoo, Devesh Roy & Arvind Subramanian, The Africa Growth and 
Opportunity Act and its Rules of Origin: Generosity Undermined?, 26 WORLD 
ECON. 829 (2003); Denis Audet, Smooth as Silk? A First Look at the Post MFA 
Textiles and Clothing Landscape, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 267 (2007); José Anson, 
Marc Bacchetta & Matthias Helble, Using Preferences to Promote LDC 
Exports: A Canadian Success Story?, J. WORLD TRADE 285 (2009). 
 73. For background reading, see UNCTAD, Trade Preferences for LDCs: 
An Early Assessment of Benefits and Possible Improvements, 
UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/2003/8 (2003). See also Drusilla K. Brown, General 
Equilibrium Effects of the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences, 54 S. ECON. 
J. 27 (1987). Note that some strands of economic theory suggest that this 
concentration of benefits, or “lumpiness,” should not be a surprise as in a 
competitive global environment, comparative advantage may be narrowly 
concentrated in a few tasks. See, e.g., Ricardo Hausmann & Dani Rodrik, 
Economic Development as Self-Discovery, 72 J. DEV. ECON. 603 (2003) (noting 
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example, the United State’s AGOA program. In 2003, 
approximately 33 Sub-Saharan African states were eligible for 
preferential treatment under AGOA. However, three states— 
Nigeria, South Africa and Gabon—accounted for over 86% of 
total AGOA imports.74 Benefits were similarly highly 
concentrated in a few economic sectors. In 2003, energy-related 
products represented 79.5 per cent of U.S. purchases from sub-
Saharan states; the second largest sector, textiles and apparel, 
accounted for 8.5 per cent of US imports.75 Within the apparel 
sector, the seven sub-Saharan states that accounted for 99% of 
exports to the United States before AGOA also captured 99% of 
exports after AGOA was enacted.76 Similar results were 
obtained with other preferential programs;77 as a general 
matter “the top ten beneficiaries . . . generally account for 80–
90 percent of total imports . . . receiving preferences under any 
individual scheme.“78 Even more troubling, emerging literature 
suggests that a substantial share of the “benefits” generated by 
preferential market access may accrue to importers in 
developed states, rather than exporting firms in the beneficiary 
state.79 
Taken together, the features identified above have 
significantly reduced the economic and developmental impacts 
of preferential programs. Trade effects are historically difficult 
to estimate accurately, but some conclusions can be drawn from 
 
narrow specialization of many countries). 
 74. 5 USITC U.S. TRADE AND INVESTMENT WITH SUB-SAHARAN AFR. 2–4 
(2004). 
 75. Id. at iii. 
 76. Marcelo Olarreaga and Çalgar Özden, AGOA and Apparel: Who 
Captures the Tariff Rent in the Presence of Preferential Market Access? 28 
WORLD ECON. 63, 67 (2005). On the other hand, these states enjoyed dramatic 
increases in their exports to the U.S. following AGOA’s enactment. Id.  
 77. See, e.g., Sangeeta Khorana, Do Trade Preferences Enhance Market 
Access for Developing Countries’ Agricultural Products? Evidence from 
Switzerland, 41 J. WORLD TRADE 1073 (2007) (discussing the impact of trade 
preferences on the agriculture sector). 
 78. Keck & Low, supra note 60, at 158. 
 79. See, e.g., Bernard Hoekman & Susan Prowse, Economic Policy 
Responses to Preference Erosion: From Trade as Aid to Aid for Trade 6 (World 
Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3721, 2005), available at 
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/
2005/09/19/000016406_20050919093149/Rendered/PDF/wps3721.pdf. (“In the 
case of market power, the result is a simple redistribution of the benefits of 
preferences: rents are transferred to importers.”); Olarreaga & Özden, supra 
note 76. 
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developments since 1960. Firstly, there is little doubt that 
developing states, especially those in East Asia, which were 
granted the fewest preferences experienced the greatest 
growth. Conversely, states granted the most preferences, like 
those of sub-Saharan Africa, have not significantly diversified 
their exports or substantially increased their per capita income 
despite being.80More broadly, many of the empirical studies 
that calculate the aggregate effects of preference programs 
suggest that that they have produced at best a “modest” 
increase in beneficiary state exports, with some of these gains 
resulting from trade diversion, rather than trade creation.81  
Somewhat counterintuitively, a number of more recent 
empirical studies find that GSP is associated with negative 
economic effects. For example, Özden and Reinhardt find that 
participating in the U.S. GSP is not associated with an increase 
in trade.82 A more recent study found that in the absence of 
GATT/WTO membership or a PTA, preference programs 
increase trade between states by 41%; however, if states have 
one of these other trade relationships, then the granting of 
preferences appears to benefit the importing state and harm 
the exporting state.83 Similar counterintuitive results were 
 
 80. Joseph Francois, Bernard Hoekman, & Miriam Manchin, Preference 
Erosion and Multilateral Trade Liberalization, 20 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 
197, 197–198 (2006). 
 81. See generally André Sapir & Lars Lundberg, The U.S. Generalized 
System of Preferences and Its Impacts, in THE STRUCTURE AND EVOLUTION OF 
RECENT U.S. TRADE POLICY 195 (Robert E. Baldwin & Anne O. Krueger eds., 
1984) (examining the complexities of GSP effects on beneficiary countries); 
Craig R. MacPhee & Victor Iwuagwu Oguledo, The Trade Effects of the U.S. 
Generalized System of Preferences, 19 ATLANTIC ECON. J., Dec. 1991, at 19 
(examining the weak impact of the U.S. GSP on LDCs); Drusilla K. Brown, 
Trade and Welfare Effects of the European Schemes of the Generalized System 
of Preferences, 37 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 757 (1989) (examining 
GSP effects on importers and exporters); Ingo Borchert, Trade Diversion 
Under Selective Preferential Market Access, 42 CANADIAN J. ECON. 1390 (2009) 
(examining the European Community’s GSP program and its “trade-distorting 
effects”); John Whalley, Non-Discriminatory Discrimination: Special and 
Differential Treatment Under GATT for Developing Countries, 100 ECON. J. 
1318 (1990) (examining the effects of special and differential treatment on 
trade performance).  
 82. Çalgar Özden & Eric Reinhardt, The Perversity of Preferences: GSP 
and Developing Country Trade Policies, 1976–2000, 78 J. DEV. ECON 1, 2 
(2005). 
 83. Judith L. Goldstein, Douglas Rivers & Michael Tomz, Institutions in 
International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO 
on World Trade, 61 INT’L ORG. Winter 2007 at 37, 63. The authors 
characterize this finding as “implausible” and as a “mystery left to be solved.” 
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reached in a recent study using quite different data and 
econometric techniques.84 Hence, the general consensus is that 
the economic effects of preference programs have been, at best, 
disappointing; a more pessimistic account concluded that 
“[b]eyond some relative success stories, the picture is dismal.”85 
To be sure, the empirical studies summarized above should 
not be understood as conclusive arguments against the utility 
of preference programs. First, empirically identifying the 
effects of preferences is extraordinarily difficult, as researchers 
must attempt to separate out the specific impacts of preference 
programs from multiple other factors.86 In addition, the studies 
do not always carefully separate the effects of different 
preference programs; for example, studies that focus the effect 
of GSP programs may be seriously misleading, as over time 
some of these programs have been supplemented by a variety of 
other programs that afford more preferential treatment, such 
as CBI, AGOA and EBA.87 And the fact that the benefits of 
preferential programs are narrowly concentrated may be less a 
criticism of the design of these programs than a reflection of 
how comparative advantage operates in a globalized economy, 
given the fragmentation of global production chains.88 Finally, 
it bears repeating that the literature here is vast, and no 
consensus on the effects of preferences emerges. While a 
majority of published studies suggest that preferences have 
limited—or even negative—economic effects, other studies, 
 
 84. See, e.g., Bernhard Herz & Marco Wagner, Do the World Trade 
Organization and the Generalized System of Preferences Foster Bilateral 
Trade? 10 (Universität Bayreuth, Diskussionpapier 01–07, 2007) (“We find a 
significantly negative effect of the Generalized System of Preferences of 
around -16% on bilateral trade . . . .”). 
 85. UNCTAD, supra note 73, at X.  
 86. For example, it is difficult for empirical analysis to address the so-
called endogeneity effect. Imagine that the United States extended 
preferential tariff treatment to goods from a particular developing state just as 
that state was emerging from a protracted civil war. It would be quite difficult 
empirically to determine how much of a hypothetical boost in exports would be 
related to reduced tariffs and how much to the end of the fighting. 
 87. For example, a more useful, albeit more complex, approach is to look 
at the size, utilization and value of all non-reciprocal trade preference 
programs. For one such effort, see Judith M. Dean & John Wainio, 
Quantifying the Value of U.S. Tariff Preferences for Developing Countries, in 
TRADE PREFERENCE EROSION: MEASUREMENT AND POLICY RESPONSE 29 
(Bernard Hoeckman, Will Martin, Carlos A. Primo Braga eds., 2009). 
 88. See, e.g., Anthony Venables, Rethinking Economic Growth in a 
Globalizing World: An Economic Geography Lens, in URBANIZATION AND 
GROWTH 47, 51 (Michael Spence, Patricia Clarke Annez & Robert M. Buckley 
eds., 2008) (discussing fragmentation as a part of the globalization process). 
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using different assumptions and methodologies, find more 
positive results.89  
Perhaps most importantly, the relatively disappointing 
economic results of preference programs to date can be 
understood more as an argument for their reform than as an 
argument for their elimination. That is, the econometric 
analysis summarized above can be understood as a powerful 
critique of preference programs as they are currently designed 
and implemented, as opposed to a critique of their underlying 
logic or purpose. Empirical research suggests that liberalizing 
product coverage and rules of origin, for example, can 
substantially increase developing state exports.90 Similarly, 
where preferences are stable and secure, trade and investment 
have increased.91 Moreover, recent scholarship suggests a 
number of ways that preference programs can be reformed to 
provide greater economic benefits to developing states.92 
B. A POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS 
As noted above, Developing Countries does not attempt to 
review or analyze the substantial empirical literature on 
preferences. Nevertheless, Hudec’s conclusions are broadly 
consistent with those reached in the empirical literature: 
 
 89. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER STEVENS & JANE KENNAN, COMPARATIVE 
STUDY OF G8 PREFERENTIAL ACCESS SCHEMES FOR AFRICA: REPORT ON A 
DFID-COMMISSIONED STUDY 125 (2004) (providing a study of preferential 
schemes and finding that “the system works . . . .”); Garth Frazer & Johannes 
Van Biesebroeck, Trade Growth under the African Growth and Opportunity 
Act 2 (Univ. of Toronto Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper 289, 2007) (finding that 
AGAO has had “a large and robust impact” on African exports to the U.S.). 
 90. Paul Collier & Anthony J. Venables, Rethinking Trade Preferences: 
How Africa Can Diversify its Exports, 14 WORLD ECON: GLOBAL TRADE POL’Y 
2007 137, 145–152 (David Greenway ed., 2007) (discussing increase in exports 
from Africa to the U.S. when the U.S. liberalized rules of origin). 
 91. See Judith M. Dean, Do Preferential Trade Agreements Promote 
Growth? An Evaluation of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (USITC 
Office of Econ., Working Paper No. 2002–07–A, 2002) (finding the CBERA has 
trade-induced-investment effects). 
 92. For recent and thoughtful efforts to prompt a debate over reform along 
these lines, see PETER KLEEN & SHELIA PAGE, SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL 
TREATMENT OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
(2005) available at http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/2445.pdf; T. 
Edemola Oyejide, Special and Differential Treatment, in DEVELOPMENT, 
TRADE, AND THE WTO: A HANDBOOK 504 (Bernard Hoekman, Aaditya Mattoo, 
& Philip English eds., 2002); Claire Melamed, Doing”Development” at the 
World Trade Organization: The Doha Round and Special and Differential 
Treatment, INST. DEV. STUD. BULL. April 2003, at 12; Keck & Low, supra note 
60. 
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preferential treatment can be expected to provide, at best, 
marginal benefits to developing states, and may be 
counterproductive, particularly for developing states that wish 
to open their economies to the benefits of global trade.93  
Hudec’s skepticism about preferences is rooted in his 
understanding of the “practical realities” of GATT’s impact on 
domestic policy-making.94 Hudec explains that trade 
liberalization hurts some firms and individuals, and that these 
actors will generate a “normal, permanent and quite vigorous” 
opposition to trade liberalization.95 Hence, governments will 
inevitably confront a “built-in political opposition to liberal 
trade policy.”96 This opposition to liberalization will be in more 
or less continuous conflict with the various forces that favor 
increased openness to trade, including parties with direct 
interests in lowering trade barriers, such as importers and 
consumers; those with more diffuse interests in the general 
conditions of international trade, such as financial 
intermediaries and foreign investors; and those committed to 
liberal economic policies for economic or political reasons.97  
Hudec argues that the role of GATT obligations is to 
“augment the political power” of the broad, albeit diffuse, set of 
domestic interests that support trade liberalization.98 The trade 
system does so by providing legal and policy arguments to 
government officials and others who seek to overcome the 
inevitable forces of protectionism99 and by helping to mobilize 
 
 93. In this respect, Developing Countries can be located within a larger 
literature that elaborates various critiques of preferential treatment that have 
been raised repeatedly in the policy literature. See, e.g., HARRY G. JOHNSON, 
ECONOMIC POLICIES TOWARD LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (1967); Gardner 
Patterson, Would Tariff Preferences Help Economic Development?, 76 LLOYDS 
BANK REV. 18 (1965) (discussing the case for as well as against preferences 
and concluding that the costs may outweigh the benefits). For an influential 
contemporaneous report setting out the case in favor of preferences, see also 
U.N. Secretary-General, Towards a New Trade Policy for Development, Report 
by the Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.46/3 (1964), available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N64/039/90/PDF/N6403990.pdf?OpenElement.  
 94. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 116 (“[T]he dynamics of policies based on 
discrimination make it likely that preferential legal structures will eventually 
cause government to do more harm than good to the supposed beneficiaries of 
such discrimination.”).  
 95. Id. at 140. 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. at 141.  
 98. Id.  
 99. Hudec identifies four specific ways that GATT/WTO legal obligations 
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export-oriented groups to countervail the influence of import-
sensitive constituencies. Thus Hudec employs, without using 
the terms, a “liberal” understanding of the determinants of 
state policy and a “second image reversed” model of how 
international law can empower or disempower various domestic 
constituencies.100  
How do preferences change the political dynamics in 
developing states? Preference programs provide developing 
state exports with preferential access to developed state 
markets, without developing states having to “pay” for this 
increased access through tariff reductions.101 This alters the 
political dynamic in developing states, as export interests will 
now have little incentive to lobby their governments to reduce 
tariffs. Hence, although protectionist interests will continue to 
lobby developing state governments, these governments will 
experience reduced pressure from those that favor liberal 
policies. These governments will therefore face fewer incentives 
to liberalize and will be more likely to pursue protectionist 
policies. As a result, Hudec concludes that developed state 
preference programs can “provid[e] no assistance [to the 
liberalization project] and [are] probably an active political 
impediment.”102  
 
can do so: (i) The desire to honor international obligations can be sufficient to 
drive government positions, as governments seek to avoid unlawful policies 
that can produce “unpleasant and damaging public controversy;” (ii) 
International obligations provide a useful public justification for decisions 
taken on other, including less popular, reasons; (iii) International legal norms 
“are a concise way of defining policy for government officials;” and (iv) 
International obligations signal to the public not to expect or rely upon trade-
distorting measures. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 141–142.  
 100. For more on liberal theories of international law and international 
relations, see Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal 
Theory of International Politics, 51 INT’L ORG. 513 (1997); Anne-Marie 
Slaughter & Jose E. Alvarez, A Liberal Theory of International Law, 94 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. 240 (2000); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Liberal International 
Relations Theory and International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 717 (1995). For more on second image reversed theories of international 
law and international relations, see Peter Gourevitch, The Second Image 
Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics, 32 INT’L ORG. 881 
(1978); see also INTERNATIONALIZATION AND DOMESTIC POLITICS (Robert O. 
Keohane & Helen V. Milner eds., 1996); Xinyuan Dai, Why Comply? The 
Domestic Constituency Mechanism, 59 INT’L ORG. 363 (2005). For a recent 
effort to apply second-image reversed theory to decisions to comply with 
international legal norms, see Joel P. Trachtman, International Law and 
Domestic Political Coalitions: The Grand Theory of Compliance with 
International Law, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 127 (2010). 
 101. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 142 (discussing the reciprocity doctrine).  
 102. Id. at 147.  
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For developing states that wish to pursue interventionist 
policies on the grounds that under certain circumstances these 
policies enhance economic welfare,103 the picture is a bit more 
nuanced. Here, in principle, a policy of non-reciprocity may be 
desirable, as greater freedom from GATT disciplines can 
produce economic gains. The problem is in distinguishing the 
economically useful forms of government intervention from 
those that are welfare-reducing.  
Given the predictable pressures from protectionist 
interests, and his dim view of state capabilities, Hudec doubts 
the ability of developing state governments to appropriately 
draw this distinction.104 Hudec argues that “developing-country 
governments following active interventionist policies are going 
to need all the outside help they can get in order to contain 
[protectionist] forces”—and that GATT disciplines are one 
potentially important source of help.105 Hence, Hudec concludes 
that whether a developing state government wishes to pursue a 
liberal or an interventionist economic policy, preferences 
disserve developing state interests. 
IV. THEORIZING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
All works discussing state behavior necessarily, even if 
only implicitly, adopt methodological orientations towards and 
theoretical assumptions regarding the nature of states, the 
 
 103. Hudec reviews the circumstances under which interventionist policies 
may be welfare enhancing, including in the nurturing of infant industries. Id. 
at 127–32.  
 104. Id. at 144–48. On the other hand, developing states often claim that 
they are in the best position to decide whether and when to adopt 
interventionist policies and should be able to do so free of GATT disciplines. 
They also claim that since some interventions are economically useful, a 
presumption that pro-export lobbies should prevail over import-sensitive 
lobbies in developing state domestic politics is unwarranted. Developing states 
would presumably reject Hudec’s likely response—that liberalized markets are 
more likely to produce economic growth—as inconsistent with their 
experience. Some empirical research undertaken after the original publication 
of Developing Countries lends support to Hudec’s argument. See, e.g., Bernard 
Hoekman et al., Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Countries in 
the WTO: Moving Forward after Cancún, 27 WORLD ECON. 481 (2004); 
Sanjaya Lall, Selective Policies for Export Promotion: Lessons from the Asian 
Tigers, in NON-TRADITIONAL EXPORT PROMOTION IN AFRICA: EXPERIENCE AND 
ISSUES 23 (G.K. Helleiner ed., 2002); Arvind Panagariya, Evaluating the Case 
for Export Subsidies, (The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 
2276, 2000). 
  I am grateful to Frank Garcia for highlighting these arguments. 
 105. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 149. 
DUNOFF - Final Version 4/22/2011 6:16 PM 
460 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW [Vol 20:2 
 
factors that motivate them, and the incentives and constraints 
that the international system imposes upon them. Developing 
Countries is no exception and, having summarized Developing 
Countries’ arguments, it is useful to review the text’s 
methodological commitments. As noted above, the book opens 
with a systematic and comprehensive analysis of the historical 
debate over whether developing state goods should receive 
preferential treatment. Hudec’s historical narrative reads, for 
the most part, as a straightforward realist account of 
international trade relations.106 Thus, Hudec focuses on states 
that pursue what they understand to be their political and 
economic interests in the international trade regime. To do so, 
states exercise diplomatic and economic leverage, with the 
resulting agreements reflecting a compromise among 
conflicting national interests. 107  
Developing Countries’ second part, which engages in a 
political economy analysis, has a strikingly different theoretical 
and methodological orientation. Here, the focus turns from 
relations among states to interactions among interest groups 
and bureaucracies within states. However, Hudec’s analysis 
moves well beyond the familiar public choice insight that, due 
to collective action problems, well-organized special interests 
can capture domestic law-making processes.108 Instead, Hudec 
devotes substantial attention to the ways that international 
legal norms can empower or disempower various domestic 
constituencies and hence impact domestic politics. 
At first glance, one might be inclined to argue that the 
 
 106. For an analysis that adopts a similar methodological approach, but 
that disaggregates developing state positions with regard to preferences, see 
Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Political Geography of Distributive Justice, in 
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (Chi Carmody, et 
al. eds., forthcoming). 
 107. To be sure, Hudec’s account is more nuanced than this necessarily 
brief summary may suggest. Thus, for example, he recognizes the influence of 
ideas on international relations, e.g., HUDEC, supra note 1, at 65–67 
(explaining that developed states underestimate the power and significance of 
non-binding principles and that international law can play an important 
constraining role in international relations.) However, for the most part, the 
historical account in part I of Developing Countries focuses on states and their 
interests. Hudec’s focus upon state pursuit of national interest finds parallels 
in Jose Alvarez’s contribution to this issue. See Jose Alvarez, The Return of the 
State, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming, Summer 2011).  
 108. For a general introduction to public choice theories, see PUBLIC 
CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW (Daniel A. Farber, ed. 2007); DANIEL A. FARBER & 
PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 
(1991).  
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methodological and theoretical orientations of the first part of 
Developing Countries are in unacknowledged tension with the 
theoretical approaches employed in the second part of the text 
and that this tension represents an inconsistency in the 
author’s analysis. However, in the work of talented authors 
such as Hudec, such theoretical tensions often lead to the very 
center of their work, and provide clues toward understanding 
the problems Hudec is addressing. In short, the relationship 
between the different parts of the text are less a methodological 
flaw than a roadmap that points us toward the possibilities and 
limits of Hudec’s project. 
For current purposes, it is more fruitful to understand the 
diverse methodological frameworks used in different parts of 
the book as resting upon an even more foundational 
assumption that animates the entire text, namely Hudec’s 
rather bleak opinion of political actors and political 
institutions. Indeed, the inconclusive nature of the negotiations 
over preferential treatment and the disappointing, if not 
counterproductive, effects of preferential policies are entirely 
consistent with the larger narrative that informs Developing 
Countries. As explained more fully below, it is only a slight 
exaggeration to characterize the book’s overarching images of 
the trade system, and the political actors representing states 
that comprise it, as marked by contradiction and hypocrisy.  
A. HUDEC’S DARK VISION 
Virtually every actor and every policy that comes under 
Hudec’s discriminating gaze is seen as, at best, ineffective, and 
at worst, counterproductive. Domestic governments are 
repeatedly pictured as weak and hypocritical. For example, the 
original U.S. position in post-war trade negotiations was “full of 
internal contradictions,” because at the same time as it argued 
against preferences and for non-discrimination as a matter of 
principle, it insisted on trade-distorting exceptions for itself, 
such as the ability to impose quotas on agricultural imports.109 
Hudec claims that continued U.S. support for these and other 
exceptions is a “contradiction” that has been “a constant in 
GATT’s legal history and is as true today as it was in 1947.”110 
To be sure, the U.S. is not the only actor Hudec critiques. 
Hudec claims that developed state critiques of illiberal 
 
 109.  HUDEC, supra note 1, at 34. The history behind the GATT’s treatment 
of agriculture is explored in BROWN, supra note 73, at 22–28, 51–54. 
 110. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 34. 
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developing state trade policies are a “sham,” and he 
provocatively argues that “many developed countries are really 
quite happy with the absence of legal discipline over developing 
countries because it gives them an excuse for the illegal trade 
barriers they themselves are imposing.”111 He colorfully 
describes many of the ways that developed state governments 
mask the “inadequacy of the[ir] performance” in the realm of 
trade policy, including through their ability to “rearrang[e] the 
numbers until they provide maximum trade gains.”112 
Developing states, as well, seek the “easy way out” and try “to 
satisfy as many domestic political interests as possible,” even if 
such policies impose welfare costs on the state’s population.113 
Multilateral efforts fare little better in Hudec’s view. As 
noted above, Developing Countries details nearly a half-century 
of international negotiations that prove unable to resolve 
underlying tensions over preference programs. And, although 
the trading nations are unable to reach substantive agreement, 
they can and do repeatedly agree to generate many formal 
declarations and decisions that, in Hudec’s opinion, represent 
nothing more than legal form without substance. Hudec is 
scornful of the enormous amount of energy and attention 
devoted to GATT’s negotiations, never-ending meetings and 
useless bureaucratic squabbling, characterizing these efforts as 
“tedious, repetitive and often, absurd.”114 
At one point, Hudec goes so far as to suggest that the 
entire enterprise of creating a multilateral body designed to 
ensure the smooth functioning of international markets is 
potentially self-defeating.115 Hudec perceptively notes the 
paradox inherent in constructing an international trade regime 
along the lines of the GATT:  
It is possible that the design of the [international trade system] . . . 
may itself have encouraged preference for market-distorting 
solutions. The [trade regime] represented a new idea in international 
economic affairs – the idea that the governments of the world, by 
acting together in concerted rule-making activity, could shape the 
international trade environment in which their economies would 
operate. Although the sponsors of this ‘architectonic’ enterprise were 
actually seeking to diminish government activity in the market place, 
 
 111. Id. at 121. 
 112. Id. at 143. 
 113. Id. at 190. 
 114. Id. at 55. 
 115. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 187 (“It is very difficult to imagine that any 
multilateral legal instrument, backed by a multilateral institution, could ever 
be negotiated.”).  
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rule-making institutions tend to encourage just the opposite instincts 
– the urge to improve on nature by writing rules about how it should 
function. The existence of the institution tends to affirm the efficacy 
of the work it does.116 
For current purposes, it is not necessary to determine 
whether the “realist” orientation Hudec adopts in the first part 
of Developing Countries is entirely consistent with, or more or 
less descriptively accurate than, the “liberal” approach 
employed in the second part of the book, or whether his dark 
view of state actors is exaggerated or accurate. Rather, the goal 
here is to unmask the implications of Hudec’s methodological 
commitments, to juxtapose them with the tools of the 
econometric analysis discussed above, and to examine whether 
and how a research agenda that borrows from or employs both 
methodologies might enrich our understanding of preferences 
and their effects upon developing states. I turn to this task 
below.  
B. ADVANCING THE DEBATE OVER THE EFFECTS OF 
PREFERENCES 
Hudec’s emphasis on political economy and dark vision of 
politics and institutions, combined with the empirical research 
summarized above, suggest the outlines of a progressive 
research agenda.117 What insights might be gained by 
juxtaposing Developing Countries’ dark vision of politics with 
 
 116. Id. at 31. Ironically, the only entities that do not appear to engage in 
counterproductive and self-defeating behavior are the protectionist interests 
who are able to successfully pursue policies that advance their interests while 
disserving the interests of their fellow citizens. In contrast to the other actors 
that appear in Developing Countries, these rent-seeking interests seem well-
organized, purposive, and all-too-successful. Of course, given the problems 
that plague decision-making in all other institutions, it is not clear why rent-
seeking firms and industries will not also, at times, pursue counterproductive 
strategies. Nor does Hudec address why, even if protectionist interests 
attempt to pursue their interests in a rational manner, they will not suffer 
from incomplete information and bounded rationality, or from problems of 
corruption, fraud, and malfeasance, like other institutions. 
 117. By “progressive” I do not mean to suggest a particular political 
orientation but rather a research methodology that seeks to generate 
predictions, and then prove or disprove these predictions with data, to 
generate a coherent research agenda. For more the idea of a progressive 
research agenda, see IMRE LAKATOS, THE METHODOLOGY OF SCIENTIFIC 
RESEARCH PROGRAMMES (John Worrall & Gregory Currie eds., 1978); Imre 
Lakatos, Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research 
Programmes, in CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE: PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COLLOQUIUM IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 91 
(Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave eds., 1970).  
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the econometric research exploring the empirical effect of 
preferential trade polices? Can utilizing political economy and 
econometric analysis reveal any hidden costs—or benefits—
associated with the enactment and administration of 
preferential tariff policies?  
A full exploration of these questions is well beyond the 
scope of this article. However, by way of example, I sketch out 
below three lines of inquiry that may reveal important and 
underappreciated effects of preferential trade policies. Utilizing 
both political economy and econometric analysis could shed 
light on:  
(i) whether the proliferation of preferential tariff programs 
produces greater protectionism in developing states and, if so, 
whether preference programs can be refined to avoid this 
result;  
(ii) whether the proliferation of preferential tariff programs 
has contributed to the dramatic increase in the number of 
bilateral and regional trade agreements and, if so, whether 
these agreements promote or hinder developing state interests; 
(iii) whether the debate over preferences has served, in 
part, to divert attention from policies more likely to promote 
developing state growth and, if so, whether the trade regime 
can encourage developing states to pursue more successful 
economic policies. 
 
1. Do preference programs reinforce protectionism in 
developing states? 
As noted above, on political economy grounds Hudec 
argues that preferences are unlikely to assist developing state 
governments that wish to pursue liberalized trade policies. This 
claim should be empirically testable. An influential 2005 study 
by Özden and Reinhardt examined 154 developing states and 
found that states dropped from the United States’s GSP 
program subsequently adopted lower trade barriers than those 
states that remained eligible for the program.118 This result is 
entirely consistent with Developing Countries’ argument. 
Hudec suggests that developing states’ ability to enjoy 
preferential access to developed state markets will reduce the 
incentives that beneficiary state exporters have to lobby for 
 
 118. Özden & Reinhardt, supra note 54, at 1.  
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trade liberalization.119 As a result, the policy process will be 
dominated by import-sensitive groups, and governments will be 
more likely to respond to their pleas.  
This apparent confirmation of Hudec’s insight by empirical 
research suggests several areas of further inquiry. For 
example, the Özden and Reinhardt study examines only states 
that participate in the U.S. GSP program. Additional studies 
could examine the effects of participation in various other 
preference programs to determine whether some have greater 
effects on beneficiary states than others; similarly, as 
preference programs differ in their details, it may be fruitful to 
examine how different types of programs influence the balance 
between protectionist and liberalizing forces within beneficiary 
states.  
Moreover, the Özden and Reinhardt study examines 
available data on aggregate trade openness;120 future studies 
might focus less on degrees of openness and more on levels of 
economic performance. Is being a beneficiary of developed state 
preference programs associated with increased GDP or greater 
levels of foreign investment? Or with improved quality of life 
indicators?121 Perhaps more importantly, future studies should 
attempt to identify the actual political economy mechanisms 
that produce the effects Özden and Reinhardt identify. These 
studies might suggest ways to fine-tune preference programs to 
avoid the “perverse” effects they seem to have on developing 
states.  
A related topic of great importance involves the effects of 
preference programs that include various forms of 
conditionality. For example, following the Appellate Body 
report in the GSP dispute, the European Union revised its GSP 
program.122 The new program extends additional tariff 
 
 119. See generally HUDEC, supra note 1, at 176–79 (arguing against 
preferential treatment policies).  
 120. Özden & Reinhardt, supra note 54, at 9.  
 121. This approach to development is reflected in, for example, the UNDP’s 
annual Human Development Report. See Human Development Reports, 
UNDP, http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2011). This 
approach is associated with the writings of Amartya Sen and Martha 
Nussbaum. See, e.g., MARTHA NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH (2000); AMARTYA SEN, 
DEMOCRACY AS FREEDOM (1999). 
 122. Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Conditions for the 
Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 
7, 2004). For an analysis of this decision, see Dunoff, supra note 64; Gregory 
Shaffer & Yvonne Apea, Institutional Choice in the Generalized System of 
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preferences to developing states that commit to ratify and 
implement a number of human rights and good governance 
conventions.123 U.S. preference programs similarly condition 
certain preferences on various types of domestic reforms in 
beneficiary states, particularly by requiring that workers’ 
rights be protected. As discussed below, an emerging school of 
thought argues that increased respect for rule of law, human 
rights, labor rights, and so forth is important determinants of 
economic performance. Moreover, the comparative politics 
literature has long debated the political institutional 
determinants of liberal trade policy.124 The existence of 
multiple preference programs that require different types of 
domestic reforms offer a valuable means to test the hypotheses 
developed in these literatures.  
Finally, it should be possible empirically to investigate 
whether PTAs or unilateral preference programs produce 
greater changes in the human rights and related practices of 
target states. An emerging literature argues that PTAs can be 
more effective than human rights treaties at changing the 
human rights behavior of repressive states.125 Professor 
Hafner-Burton, perhaps the most prominent voice in this camp, 
argues that international instruments designed to influence 
human rights practices need legally enforceable, binding 
obligations to be successful.126 Using cross-national analysis 
over several decades, she purports to demonstrate that PTAs 
with hard standards and effective enforcement often induce 
greater protection of human rights. Hence, she argues, PTAs 
can be more effective at changing repressive state practice the 
 
Preferences Case: Who Decides the Conditions for Trade Preferences? The Law 
and the Politics of Rights, 39 J. WORLD TRADE 977 (2005). 
 123. Council Regulation (EC) 980/2005, Applying a Scheme of Generalised 
Tariff Preferences, 2005 O.J. (L169/1). 
 124. See, e.g., Sean Erlich, Access to Protection: Domestic Institutions and 
Trade Policy in Democracies, 61 INT’L ORG. 571 (2007); Witold J. Henisz & 
Edward D. Mansfield, Votes and Vetoes: The Political Determinants of 
Commercial Openness, 50 INT’L STUDIES Q. 189 (2006); Helen V. Milner & 
Keiko Kubota, Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in 
the Developing Countries, 59 INT’L ORG. 107 (2005); Gene M. Grossman & 
Elhanan Helpman, A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics, 120 Q. J. 
ECON. 1239 (2005); Mancur Olson, Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development, 
87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 567 (1993). 
 125. See, e.g., EMILIE M. HAFNER-BURTON, FORCED TO BE GOOD: WHY 
TRADE AGREEMENTS BOOST HUMAN RIGHTS (2009); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, 
Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence 
Government Repression, 59 INT’L ORG. 593 (2005). 
 126. Hafner-Burton, Trading Human Rights, supra note 125, at 594–595. 
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human rights practices of repressive governments than human 
rights agreements can be.127 Extending this work, it would be 
useful to compare whether preferential arrangements have a 
similar effect on human rights policies; whether ‘positive’ or 
‘negative’ incentives have a greater impact; and how the design 
of conditionality clauses changes their effects.  
2. Do preference programs contribute to an increase in the 
number of preferential trade agreements? 
Trading nations have entered into a frenzy of bilateral and 
regional trade agreements in recent years; indeed, more 
preferential trade agreements were created during the WTO’s 
first decade than during GATT’s five decades. Moreover, unlike 
in the past, many recent bilateral and regional free trade 
agreements have been between developed and developing 
countries. Although a growing literature attempts to explain 
the causes and consequences of the proliferation of preferential 
trade agreements (PTAs),128 virtually no empirical scholarship 
examines whether there is a causal link between the creation of 
preferential trade programs and the rise in preferential trade 
agreements.129  
A causal relationship is quite plausible, particularly if one 
adopts the realist perspective Hudec uses in the first part of 
Developing Countries, where states are concerned about 
relative gains. As noted above, preferential trade programs are 
inherently unstable in several respects. For example, developed 
states have broad discretion to add or subtract countries and 
goods from their preference programs.130 Plus, as developing 
 
 127. Id. at 597. 
 128. See, e.g., Jayant Menon, Dealing with the Proliferation of Bilateral 
Free Trade Agreements, 32 WORLD ECON. 1381 (2009); John Whalley, Recent 
Regional Agreements: Why So Many, Why So Much Variance in Form, Why 
Coming So Fast, and Where Are They Headed?, 31 WORLD ECON. 517 (2008); 
Roberto V. Fiorentino et al., The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade 
Agreements: 2006 Update, WTO DISCUSSION PAPER NO 12 (2007), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/disc_paper12_e.htm.  
 129. The terminology for these trade agreements can be confusing. For 
current purposes, I wish to contrast the WTO agreements, on the one hand, 
and all bilateral, regional and plurilateral trade agreements of a preferential 
nature, on the other hand. The traditional umbrella term used for this latter 
group of agreements is “regional trade agreements.” However, increasingly 
these agreements are entered into by states that are not geographic neighbors. 
Hence, I will usually refer to these agreements as preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs) rather than use the traditional term of regional trade 
agreements. 
 130. See, e.g., Sunburst Farms Inc.v. U.S., 620 F. Supp. 735, 735 (CIT 
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states grow their economies and become more effective 
exporters, they are “graduated” from preference programs. To 
address the instability and uncertainties associated with GSP 
programs, developing states might seek to enter into PTAs with 
developed states. The rationale for doing so would be relatively 
straightforward: in contrast to preference programs which exist 
and can be changed at the discretion of developed states, PTAs 
are reciprocal agreements governed by international law and 
cannot be unilaterally changed. 
This relatively simple hypothesis suggests a rich research 
agenda. For example, empirical research could attempt to 
identify the factors that induce developing states to enter into 
trade agreements with developed states. Might developing 
states fear the loss of preferential access to developed state 
markets, for example, by being excluded from GSP and related 
programs? Do developing states seek PTAs when they see 
developed states negotiating PTAs with other developing 
countries, or when competitors obtain preferential market 
access? In short, do developing states use PTAs an insurance 
policy against being placed at a competitive disadvantage 
through discriminatory policies?  
This potential link between preference programs and PTAs 
is important, because there is substantial evidence that the rise 
of PTAs may disserve developing state interests. First, recent 
experience suggests that, in practice, many of the problems 
associated with preference programs – such as trade diversion, 
product exclusions, and complex rules of origin – are largely 
replicated in PTAs.131 Moreover, many PTAs are very broad in 
scope. Notably, in recent years the inclusion of issues beyond 
the WTO’s ambit has been especially marked in PTAs among 
developed and developing economies.132 For example, at the 
2004 WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun, developing states 
were able to exclude the so-called “Singapore Issues” of trade 
 
1985); Florsheim Shoe Co. v. U. S., 744 F.2d 787 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 131. See generally Report by the Consultative Board to the Director—
General Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Future of the WTO: Addressing 
Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium, WTO (2004) (“examin[ing] the 
functioning of the institution – the WTO – and consider[ing] how well it is 
equipped to carry the weight of future.”). 
 132. See, e.g., World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2005: Trade, 
Regionalism and Development (2005) (discussing “the characteristics of 
agreements that strongly promote—or hinder—development for member 
countries?” and whether “the proliferation of agreements pose[s] risks to the 
multilateral trading system, and how those risks can be managed?”). 
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facilitation, investment, government procurement and 
competition from the negotiating agenda. However, these 
issues are addressed in many recent PTAs between developing 
and developed country partners.133 Similarly, the United States 
is able to address issues that developing states can keep out of 
WTO negotiations, like labor and environment, in its PTAs 
with developing states.  
Finally, there is substantial evidence that developed states’ 
ability to address WTO-plus issues in PTAs with developing 
states has reduced developed states’ willingness to reduce 
tariffs on a multilateral basis. For example, empirical research 
suggests that both EU and U.S. reductions in MFN tariffs for 
PTA products during the Uruguay Round were on average only 
about one-half of the reduction for similar products that did not 
receive preferences.134 To the extent that U.S. and EU 
preference programs require cooperation in labor, environment, 
drug enforcement, immigration and other issues, we might 
understand the extension of preferential trade access as 
payment by developed states to developing states for 
cooperation. This implies “that a reduction in MFN tariffs that 
lowers the preferential margin will be resisted by both the 
country that receives preferences and the country that grants 
them;”135 more broadly, it implies that the current round of 
PTAs between developing and developed states may serve as 
stumbling blocks, rather than building blocks, to multilateral 
liberalization.136 And substantial research suggests that 
 
 133. Examples of PTAs between developed and developing countries 
including all or some of the Singapore issues include: EC-South Africa, EFTA-
Chile, United States–Morocco, United States-Jordan, and Thailand-Australia.  
 134. Nuno Limão, Preferential Trade Agreements as Stumbling Blocks for 
Multilateral Trade Liberalization: Evidence for the US., 96 AM. ECON. REV. 
896, 903–910 (2006); Baybars Karacaovali & Nuno Limão, The Clash of 
Liberalizations: Preferential versus Multilateral Trade Liberalization in the 
European Union 18–26 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 
3493, 2005) (“analyz[ing] the effects of [preferential trade agreements] on 
multilateral trade liberalization. . .”). 
 135. Nuno Limão & Marcelo Olarreaga, Trade Preferences to Small 
Developing Countries and the Welfare Costs of Lost Multilateral Liberalization, 
20 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 217, 219 (2006). 
 136. Richard E. Baldwin & Elena Seghezza, Are Trade Blocs Building or 
Stumbling Blocs?, 25 J. ECON. INTEG. 276, 276 (2010); Philippe Aghion, et al., 
Negotiating Free Trade, 73 J. INT’L ECON 1, 2 (2007); Caroline Freund, 
Multilateralism and the Endogenous Formation of Preferential Trade 
Agreements, 52 J. INT’L ECON. 359 (2000) (“examin[ing] the interaction 
between preferential trade agreements and multilateral tariff reduction in a 
model of imperfect competition”). 
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multilateral liberalization would benefit developing states more 
than preferential liberalization.137 
These arguments point towards a series of substantial, 
albeit indirect, hidden costs associated with preference 
programs. However, there are a number of claims embedded in 
these arguments that would benefit from empirical research. 
For example, the studies cited above examine the effect of PTAs 
on U.S. and EU tariff rates; future studies could extend this 
inquiry to other states that grant preferences, such as 
Australia or Japan, to see if similar results obtain. Moreover, 
the studies cited above focus on tariffs; future studies could 
explore whether PTAs affect market access through non-tariff 
barriers.  
In addition, future research could address related lines of 
inquiry. For example, how do PTAs affect states that are not 
part of the PTA? If, as suggested above, the EU liberalizes less 
on an MFN basis because of its PTAs, might that lead, say, the 
EU’s negotiating partners to reciprocate by offering fewer 
concessions than they would otherwise be willing to?138 If so, 
that would mean that the increase in the number of PTAs 
might generate important adverse spillover effects on non-
parties.  
Questions like these can be investigated using econometric 
analysis. However, even if econometric studies reveal various 
indirect effects of preferences, these studies would ultimately 
call for a political economy explanation for precisely how PTAs 
effect multilateral liberalization. Hence, inquiries like these are 
illustrative of how econometric and political economy 
explanations can be mutually reinforcing and can illuminate 
the underexplored relationship between preference programs 
and PTAs. 
3. Is the debate over preferences a diversion? 
Finally, there is an important issue that Developing 
Countries does not explicitly address: the possible diversionary 
effect of the debate over preferences itself. As the first part of 
Developing Countries illustrates, developing state demands “for 
 
 137. Glenn Harrison et al., Rules of Thumb for Evaluating Preferential 
Trading Arrangements: Evidence from Computable General Equilibrium 
Assessments, 40 CUADERNOS DE ECONOMÍA 460, at 3 (2003) available at 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/events/docs/harrisontarr.pdf. 
 138. Nuno Limão, Preferential vs. Multilateral Trade Liberalization: 
Evidence and Open Questions, 5 WORLD TRADE REV. 155, 171 (2006). 
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greater market access [became] the first issue on the agenda” 
during the GATT’s early years,139 and has remained at or near 
the center of the international trade agenda ever since. The 
contrast between the political salience of preferences and their 
disappointing economic results raises an intriguing puzzle: if 
preferential treatment generates limited economic benefits – 
and renders the pursuit of effective economic policies more 
difficult—why do developing states continue to advocate for 
these programs?  
Perhaps another of Hudec’s observations in Developing 
Countries may shed light on this puzzle. Despite—or perhaps 
because of—his deep engagement with the trade system, Hudec 
was acutely aware of the limits of trade law and policy. Hudec 
emphasizes that the economic performance of a developing 
state is influenced more by its domestic policies than by 
developed state trade policy; he writes that “a government’s 
own trade-policy decisions are the most important determinant 
of its own economic welfare.”140 Recent empirical studies lend 
support the claim that export performance correlates with 
economic reforms in the exporting country.141 This claim fits 
into a larger literature—mostly produced after Developing 
Countries was first published—arguing that access to rich 
country markets is a necessary but far from sufficient condition 
for development, and that various features of the domestic 
domain such as meaningful political representation, individual 
liberties, independent judiciaries, the rule of law, and other 
aspects of institutional and legal infrastructure are critical 
determinants of domestic growth.142 This research suggests 
 
 139. Hudec, supra note 1, at 53. 
 140. Id. at 139. 
 141. See, e.g., United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, The 
African Growth and Opportunity Act: A Preliminary Assessment, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/2003/1 (2003) (offer[ing] an early assessment of the 
utility of the AGOA tariff preferences as an instrument of special and 
differential (S&D) treatment for the beneficiary countries.”). 
 142. An influential body of political economy scholarship focuses upon 
domestic institutions. See, e.g., Dani Rodrik et al., Institutions Rule: The 
Primary of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic 
Development, 9 J ECON. GROWTH 131 (2004) (“estimate[ing] the respective 
contributions of institutions, geography, and trade in determining income 
levels around the world”); Daron Acemoglu et al., The Colonial Origins of 
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 
1369(2001) (examining “differences in European mortality rates to estimate 
the effect of institutions on economic performance”); Robert Hall & Charles 
Jones, Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker 
than Others, 114 Q. J. ECON. 83(1999) (“show[ing] that differences in physical 
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that the primary responsibility for the disappointing economic 
performance of many developing states reflects domestic 
constraints—including limited supply side capacity, sub-par 
infrastructure, and underdeveloped political and legal 
institutions—rather than developed state trade policies.  
Perhaps as a result, in the past few years much of the 
dialogue at the WTO concerning developing states has shifted 
from a focus on preferences to the so-called Aid-for-Trade 
initiative. The key analytic move making this dialogue possible 
is the widespread acknowledgment that developing states 
continue to face significant supply-side capacity and 
infrastructure constraints that inhibit their ability to expand 
international trade. As a result, developing states, donor 
nations, regional bodies and international organizations have 
coalesced around an Aid for Trade mandate agreed to at the 
WTO’s 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Conference. Since then, 
much attention has focused on the need to mainstream trade 
into national development plans on the rationale that doing so 
will help states mitigate potential adjustment costs and assists 
developing states seize trade opportunities. Significantly, 
funding for Aid for Trade activities more than doubled between 
2005 and 2007, and has continued to increase even in the face 
of the global economic crisis.  
The emphasis of the Aid for Trade initiative has shifted 
over time. During the early years—between the Hong Kong 
Ministerial in 2005 and the First Global Review of Aid for 
Trade in 2007—the focus was on raising awareness and 
generating commitment among various stakeholders. 
Thereafter, the focus has shifted to implementation and 
monitoring. Implementation rests largely in the hands of 
developing countries, in partnership with development 
organizations and funders, including the World Bank and 
regional development banks, international financial 
organizations, and bilateral donors. A significant monitoring 
 
capital and educational attainment can only partially explain the variation in 
output per worker” and “document[ing] that the differences in capital 
accumulation, productivity, and…output per worker are driven by differences 
in institutions and government policies.”). Many of the arguments in this 
literature regarding the importance of domestic institutions build upon the 
pioneering work of Douglass North. See, e.g., DOUGLASS NORTH, 
INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990) 
(discussing “an analytical framework for explaining the ways in which 
institutions and institutional change affect performance of economies, both at 
a given time and over time”).  
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and evaluation effort is also underway, with the goal of 
encouraging key actors to meet commitments and improving 
the effectiveness of programs. The WTO and OECD joint 
publication “Aid for Trade at a Glance” provides country-
specific fact sheets for nearly 90 different states.143 The WTO 
has also engaged in analysis and advocacy to highlight the 
needs of its members and to showcase effective 
implementation.144 Although Aid-for-Trade is still in its early 
stages, it represents a potentially significant shift in the debate 
within the trade system regarding how to create structures so 
that developing states can best exploit international trade 
opportunities.The disappointing economic results from 
preference programs and the shift of attention to Aid-for-Trade 
programs raise the question of whether the lengthy and 
contentious focus on preferences diverted diplomatic and 
scholarly attention to an issue of decidedly secondary 
importance and hence obscured more important issues related 
to domestic reform in developing states.145 Ironically, although 
much effort has been devoted to measuring the economic effects 
of preferences, no scholarly attention has been paid to the 
opportunity costs associated with this misdirection of 
diplomatic and political efforts. But current knowledge 
regarding successful development strategies raises the question 
of whether this diversion of energies and attention represents a 
hidden cost of the debate over preferences. 
V. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’ RHETORICAL STRATEGY 
Developing Countries is justifiably considered a classic of 
trade scholarship. However, in several important respects, the 
text—ambitious as it is—sells itself short. For example, 
Developing Countries presents itself as providing a 
straightforward account of the tensions between developed and 
 
 143. Aid-for-Trade statistics can be found at Aid for Trade at a Glance 
2009—Partner Country Information, OECD (Feb 21, 2011, 12:45 PM), 
http://www.oecd.org/document/1/0,3746,en_2649_34665_42926849_1_1_1_1,00.
html. 
 144. For a fuller description, see WTO, Aid-for-Trade Work Programme, 
2010–2011, WT/COMTD/AFT/W/16 (Nov. 27, 2009) available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/a4t_e/aid4trade_e.htm. 
 145. To be sure, this literature does not exclude the possibility that the 
relative importance of domestic policy exists precisely because existing 
preference policies have been poorly designed and unevenly applied. See, e.g., 
Frank Garcia, Beyond Special and Differential Treatment, 27 B.C. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 291 (2004).calling for an agreement on preferential treatment 
that is fair, clear and creates space for domestic policy.). 
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developing states over preferential treatment, and offering a 
pragmatic and realistic critique of then-current thinking about 
trade policy. The book is relentlessly instrumental in tone and 
approach, and can easily be taken as an example of Hudec’s oft-
noted “realistic, functional, fact-focused and anti-conceptual 
way of” thinking.146 
And yet, of course, the book presupposes a rather complex 
set of assumptions about the way the world works. Indeed, it 
could hardly be otherwise. Any instrumental approach to 
international law necessarily rests upon a series of 
assumptions about the principal actors in the trade system, 
these actors’ motivations and capacities, and the constraints 
imposed by the international system itself.147  
For example, Developing Countries implicitly utilizes an 
extremely sophisticated vision of the role and limits of 
international law, including international trade law. The text 
includes important but underdeveloped insights about the 
nature of international dispute resolution, an implicit theory of 
the mechanisms that induce compliance with international 
norms, and important observations regarding the function and 
role of soft law.148 In brief, Developing Countries assumes a 
 
 146. David Palmeter, Robert E. Hudec—A Practitioner’s Appreciation, 37 J 
WORLD TRADE 703, 705 (2003). See also Joel Trachtman, Robert Hudec and the 
Vocation of International Trade Law, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 742, 743 (2003) 
(“Hudec was impatient with most legal theory. . .”). 
 147. To be sure, instrumental approaches are not the only, or necessarily 
the best, approaches to international law. International law, including 
international trade law, can be understood as a deontological quest for justice. 
See, e.g., ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-
DETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003) 
(aiming “to develop the outlines of a coherent, systematic vision of an 
international legal order that takes the protection of human rights seriously, 
while anchoring that vision in moral reasoning that is informed both by a due 
appreciation of the limitations of existing institutions and a willingness to 
consider possibilities for institutional reform.”); FRANK GARCIA, TRADE, 
INEQUALITY AND JUSTICE: TOWARD A LIBERAL THEORY OF JUST TRADE (2003) 
(arguing that “international trade law does not exist outside of the realm of 
justice. . .”).  
 148. Hudec explored many of these themes in a number of important 
works, including Robert E. Hudec, Adjudication of International Trade 
Disputes (Trade Policy Research Centre, Thames Essay No. 16, 1978); Robert 
E. Hudec, Reforming GATT Adjudication Procedures: The Lessons of the DISC 
Case, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1443 (1988); Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute 
Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. 
GLOBAL TRADE 1 (1999); Robert E. Hudec, Broadening the Scope of Remedies 
in WTO Dispute Settlement, in IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
PROCEDURES—ISSUES AND LESSONS FROM THE PRACTICE OF OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 345 (Friedl Weiss ed., 2000) ; Robert 
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rather complex account of the ways that international law does 
and does not affect state behavior, and it is a text of enormous 
theoretical interest and sophistication. As a result, Developing 
Countries is a much richer and theoretically ambitious 
undertaking than it lets on. Although it is refreshing to 
encounter a text that does not try to oversell itself, it is worth 
considering whether there are hidden costs to Hudec’s 
undersell.  
To approach this issue, it is useful to consider what has 
changed in the two decades since Developing Countries first 
appeared. The trade regime has, of course, seen substantial 
institutional and doctrinal changes, including the creation of 
the WTO, the expansion of trade disciplines into new areas 
such as intellectual property and services, and the 
establishment of the WTO’s strengthened dispute settlement 
system. Moreover, when Developing Countries was first 
released, the GATT was a relatively obscure institution. 
Indeed, during its first several decades, the GATT operated as 
a “club” where a relatively small number of diplomats and 
economists from like-minded states worked quietly to make 
trade policy without significant public input or oversight.149 In 
short, when Hudec wrote Developing Countries, the trade 
regime was practically unknown outside a small group of trade 
cognoscenti, “globalization” had not yet entered the public 
lexicon, and trade negotiations and agreements rarely captured 
media or public attention.  
International trade is no longer an obscure topic. Concerns 
over globalization and outsourcing are prominent in public 
debate and political campaigns, and trade is one of the most 
important and highly developed fields of international law. The 
WTO is a highly visible and controversial component of an 
emerging regime of global economic governance. Moreover, the 
current trade regime is no longer preoccupied with sleepy 
topics like tariffs and quotas; instead it has become a central 
 
E. Hudec, The Adequacy of WTO Dispute Settlement Remedies: A Developing 
Country Perspective, in DEVELOPMENT, TRADE AND THE WTO (Bernard 
Hoekman et al. eds., 2002). 
 149. Robert Keohane & Joseph Nye, The Club Model of Multilateral 
Cooperation and the World Trade Organization: Problems of Democratic 
Legitimacy, in EFFICIENCY, EQUALITY, AND LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL 
TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 264 (Roger Porter et al. eds., 2001). See 
also J.H.H. Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: 
Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of Dispute Settlement, id. 
at 334; Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy— and Back Again: The 
Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 94 (2002). 
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battleground for contentious issues like developing state access 
to affordable medicines and the locus of transnational conflicts 
pitting trade against non-trade values.  
Changes in the academic study of international trade have 
been no less dramatic. Trade law was a marginalized and 
relatively underdeveloped discipline when Developing 
Countries was first issued. Trade law articles rarely appeared 
in international law journals,150 let alone flagship general topic 
law reviews,151 and many of the peer-reviewed journals that 
now help to define the field had not yet been established.152 
International trade was not taught at many law schools, and 
very few US law schools had full-time faculty who specialized 
in trade law. As a result, despite its substantial strengths, 
when Developing Countries was originally issued it was likely 
of interest only to a relatively small number of international 
trade practitioners and scholars. 
Today, international courses are offered at numerous law 
schools, economics departments, public policy schools, and 
international relations departments; a growing number of 
monographs, essay collections, and journals address trade 
issues; and conferences and symposia on international trade 
are now common. Moreover, the trade regime is an increasingly 
important object of study in several academic disciplines; 
specialists in international relations, international political 
economy, and international economics devote substantial 
attention to the trade system and address questions of great 
interest to trade lawyers such as the optimal design of the 
trade system, the nature and effects of WTO dispute 
settlement, and the function of contingent protection.  
 
 150. On the relative marginalization of international trade law in a leading 
US journal, see Detlev F. Vagts, International Economic Law and the 
American Journal of International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 769 (2006), which 
“discuss[es] the history of international economic law since the American 
Journal of International Law was first published,” and David Bederman, 
Appraising a Century of Scholarship in the American Journal of International 
Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 20 (2006), which describes the great nature of the 
“intellectual content and scholarly character” in the American Journal of 
International Law. 
 151. Indeed, it appears that the first article in an American law review on 
countervailing and antidumping duties was not published until 1958 (see 
footnote 7, supra). Peter Ehrenhaft, Memories of the Supreme Court in the 
1961 Term, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 215, 220 (2004). 
 152. The first edition of the Journal of World Trade was published in 1967. 
Other leading journals are even more recent. For example, the Journal of 
International Economic Law was first published in 1998, and the World Trade 
Review was first published in 2001. 
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The influence of these various disciplines upon each other 
has been enormous; indeed, it is no exaggeration to suggest 
that virtually all serious students of the trade regime today 
necessarily draw upon insights from disciplines that neighbor 
their own.153 Perhaps if Bob Hudec was alive today to produce 
an updated edition of his classic text, he would draw 
substantially on these literatures. Doing so would enrich 
Developing Countries in at least two respects.  
First, insights from these cognate literatures could enrich 
Developing Countries’ arguments. For example, the lively 
debate in international relations circles over the impact of 
security-related concerns on trade cooperation might inform 
Developing Countries’ reflections on why the U.S. originally 
choose to pursue a GATT with larger membership, but 
shallower commitments, and why the U.S. later shifted course 
and insisted that the Uruguay Round be a single 
undertaking.154 Perhaps more importantly, Hudec sets forth a 
controversial claim about the relative importance of developing 
states’ domestic policy as opposed to preferential access to 
developed state markets. As noted above, I take this claim to be 
one of the text’s central ideas and hence I believe that 
Developing Countries would be a stronger work if it tested this 
claim against the substantial literature that addresses the 
domestic determinants of economic growth. Doing so could 
provide support for many of Hudec’s arguments, help identify 
the limits of these arguments, and help position those 
arguments within a rich set of scholarly literatures. 
Second, locating Developing Countries’ arguments within 
their larger scholarly contexts would facilitate dialogue with a 
broader scholarly audience. Consider, for example, Hudec’s 
work on dispute settlement. His groundbreaking scholarship 
helped inspire a generation of empirical research by political 
 
 153. Ironically, Hudec himself organized one of the earliest 
interdisciplinary projects examining trade law. JAGDISH BHAGWATI & ROBERT 
HUDEC, FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? 
(1996). The American Law Institute’s publication of annual volumes that 
analyze WTO case law is a more recent initiative along these lines. See, e.g., 
THE WTO CASE LAW OF 2003 (Henrik Horn & Petros Mavroidis eds., 2006) 
summarizing that year’s studies). For a more recent examination of the ways 
that interdisciplinary approaches can enhance understanding of international 
legal phenomena, see Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, CTBS 
(forthcoming). 
 154. Richard Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based 
Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 339, 359–360 
(2002).  
DUNOFF - Final Version 4/22/2011 6:16 PM 
478 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW [Vol 20:2 
 
scientists into GATT and WTO dispute settlement.155 Hudec’s 
work did so, in part, because it presented data and evidence 
about trade disputes in a way that political scientists could 
easily understand and utilize.  
Developing Countries should likewise be of interest to a 
broad and interdisciplinary audience; in addition to 
international trade law scholars, the topics Developing 
Countries addresses are of interest to a wide variety of 
international lawyers, international political economy scholars, 
economists, and students of international development and 
international relations. Locating the broader questions raised 
by Developing Countries in the context of various scholarly 
literatures it implicates would make the book both more 
accessible and more appealing to a wide variety of readers from 
different disciplines. Doing so would render Developing 
Countries’ important insights more salient to a broader 
audience of readers. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Debates over preferential treatment for developing states 
have been a defining feature of the multilateral trade system 
since its inception. Developing Countries masterfully reviews 
the history of this controversy, and will serve as an 
authoritative guide to the historical, political and normative 
dimensions of the debate over preferential treatment for 
developing states. In addition, Developing Countries clearly 
details the arguments for and against preferential treatment 
and offers an influential critique of preference programs.  
But Developing Countries’ value is not simply historical. 
Drawing on empirical writings that largely post-date the initial 
release of Developing Countries, I have suggested some 
additional lines of inquiry inspired by Hudec’s arguments, 
including (i) whether preferential programs hinder developing 
states’ ability to liberalize; (ii) whether the proliferation of 
preferential tariff programs has inadvertently contributed to 
the proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements, 
and, if so, whether these agreements disserve developing state 
interests; and (iii) whether the debate over preferences diverts 
 
 155. See, e.g., Marc Bush & Eric Reinhardt, Testing International Trade 
Law: Empirical Studies of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement, in THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT E. 
HUDEC 457 (Daniel Kennedy & James Southwick eds., 2002) (surveying and 
analyzing empirical studies on GATT/WTO dispute settlement). 
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focus from policies more likely to promote developing state 
growth. Thus, Hudec’s arguments, combined with recent 
empirical work, suggest a research agenda designed to uncover 
whether there are hidden costs—or hidden benefits—associated 
with the debate over preferential treatment for developing 
states. For these reasons, all those interested in international 
trade should welcome the opportunity to revisit Developing 
Countries. 
 
